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In Memoriam
Russell Jack Smith

**What are We Talking About When We
Talk about Counterintelligence?**

**Sherman Kent, Willmoore Kendall, and George
Pettie—Strategic Intelligence in the Digital Age**

REVIEWS

***Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence:
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***Intelligence Theory: Key Questions
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The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf



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In Memoriam

Russell Jack Smith, Giant of CIA Analysis, Dies at 95

Nicholas Dujmovic

The Central Intelligence Agency lost a true exemplar of the analytic profession with the passing of Russell Jack Smith in late April at his home in McLean, Virginia. Smith had a long and stellar career from CIA's early days as an analyst, estimator, and head of the Directorate of Intelligence, and he capped his service with a prestigious foreign assignment.

Jack Smith, as he was known throughout his career, was born on the Fourth of July, 1913, into a working class Michigan family. He grew up with an appreciation for hard physical labor and was gifted with a brilliant mind, especially for writing. Although he graduated with distinction from Miami University of Ohio, he could not afford graduate school, so he spurned acceptances at Harvard and Yale to attend Cornell, which offered him a full scholarship. Smith earned his Ph.D. in English Literature and began teaching at Williams College in the fall of 1941.

After Pearl Harbor, Williams College went on a war footing, and Smith's contribution was teaching air navigation to prospective fliers before he signed on with the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) for the last six months of the war. After a postwar teaching stint at Wells College in New York State, Smith was offered a position in the new Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and soon was editing the daily analytic publication that CIG and then CIA prepared for President Truman.

Smith typically downplayed his own talents, but his ability to research and to write and edit clearly, as well as his unrelenting insistence on quality and his leadership skills, were recognized early and contributed to his quick rise in the Agency. He later marveled, "In the early days, we were catch-as-catch-can.... When I came back to join [CIA], having had only six months in OSS, and had been nothing but a professor of English prior to that, I came back as deputy [to the] chief of the current intelligence staff...and six months later, I was running [it]. I was editing the *Daily Summary* that went to President Truman every day."

As a member of the elite Board of National Estimates—the predecessor to today's National Intelligence Council—Smith worked closely with Agency legend Sherman Kent, who praised Smith as an officer of distinction: "He has the qualities which I believe are of greatest importance to a Board member: a lot of knowledge, a clear head, a judicious nature, drafting skill, and excellent presence.... He has my full confidence as a man fitted for a wide range of most responsible positions in the agency."

Personalities and personal connections have always been supremely important in the intelligence profession, a fact that Smith recognized and to which he, with his characteristic modesty, attributed his success. Smith had been hired into OSS by Ray Cline; in the early 1960s, then-Deputy Director for Intelligence Cline made Smith first the chief of current intelligence and then his deputy. At the time, Smith told Cline he wasn't suited to be his deputy: "What you need is someone who's a real son of a bitch." Cline responded, "Jack, I think you underestimate yourself."

Jack Smith was fearless when he felt he was in the right. He once contradicted the redoubtable DCI Walter Bedell Smith to his face, saying that the director's "fix" to a text had introduced ambiguity. Not used to being challenged, Smith the director nevertheless saw the merits of what Smith the editor had to say about the language and gave him carte blanche to edit as he saw fit. Years later, when Smith was head of the DI's Office of Current Intelligence, he took umbrage at a comment DCI John McCone made during a staff meeting to the effect that Smith's analysts were "sitting on their behinds" and not doing their jobs in making sense of a development in Soviet strategic weapons. "I don't believe that's true for an instant, Mr. McCone," Smith fired back, "and I will be glad to discuss this with you on some other occasion!" McCone glared and neither fired Smith nor took him up on his offer.

Smith was grateful for his association with Richard Helms. Smith claimed that Helms revered Williams College, his alma mater, and considered anyone who had taught there to be "pretty durned smart." It was Helms, then deputy to Director William Raborn, who recommended that Smith succeed Ray Cline as DDI in 1966. One of Smith's first and most lasting achievements in that position was the establishment of the Office of Strategic Research. OSR was where CIA analysts would do the all-source, independent, strategic assessment of military developments and trends that the US military found difficult to do—because it took a "worst case" rather than the "most likely" approach CIA favored—but in any case did not want a civilian agency to be doing.

Another practice Smith instituted as DDI was saying "no" to low priority requests for analysis. "I found frequently that people were working months on something for some junior officer in the State Department because he'd asked a question." Smith established a review of such requests but found the directorate culture so accustomed to saying "yes" that he held staff meetings in which he would have his officers practice, "Now all together, say no. No."

Five years later, Smith was ready for a change, particularly because the Nixon administration disagreed with much of his directorate's analysis. Helms sent Smith to an important field post in South Asia, where he was highly regarded by US ambassadors for his candor and judgment.

When Smith retired in late 1973, colleagues described him as one of the best all-round substantive analysts in the Intelligence Community. He received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for a career of significant contributions to the Agency and the analytic profession.

In retirement, Smith continued to write and eventually produced more than a dozen books. His greatest contribution was his memoir, *The Unknown CIA* (1989). Sadly now out of print, it has no peer as the best reflection on and explanation of a career in intelligence analysis. His other books included spy novels, which his friends enjoyed, except for the sex scenes his publisher insisted on including. His friends said they read as if they had been written by a retired professor of English and a leading drafter of intelligence products—precise in structure and detail but lacking electricity.

Another friend, like Smith a devotee of jazz, noted that long-running but friendly banter about the relative merits of various jazz musicians found their way into Smith's novels but “with Jack winning the argument, as least so long as he was writing the book.” Another book recounted his building, with his own hands, his family home, *The House That Jack Built*. When Smith lost his beloved wife of 64 years, he produced *Rosemary: A Memoir*; in 2002. He was wrestling with the plot of yet another novel when he passed away.

Reflecting on his career long after he retired, Smith was asked which job was most satisfying. He responded immediately, “I must say I enjoyed it all.”



What are We Talking About When We Talk about Counterintelligence?

John Ehrman

A consistent theme in public discussions of the performance of US intelligence is how poorly Americans conduct counterintelligence (CI). Whether it is the former chief of the CIA's Counterintelligence Center (CIC), Paul Redmond, famously observing that Americans are "too nice" to carry out CI properly or former National Counterintelligence Executive Michelle Van Cleave lamenting that the US government is failing at strategic CI or the legions of books and articles by scholars and journalists criticizing intelligence agencies for failing to catch spies and protect secrets, the conclusion is almost always the same.

"Our national CI program has failed to carry out its mission," wrote George Kalaris and Leonard McCoy in Studies in Intelligence in 1988. In 2005, the WMD Commission echoed their conclusion when it reported that "US counterintelligence efforts have remained fractured, myopic, and only marginally effective." While these criticisms often are unfair or exaggerated—the United States has had many CI successes—they do contain elements of truth. US counterintelligence efforts often are poorly organized, conceptualized, and executed, and CI remains a relatively neglected area of study in the Intelligence Community.¹

A large reason for this neglect is the absence of a theory for counterintelligence. This problem is not unique to CI, and students of intelligence have noted that the field as a whole suffers from a lack of strong theoretical work. Counterintelligence, however, seems to be worse off than the rest of the intelligence disciplines. Recent intelligence scholarship, for example, has discussed theoretical issues relating to the definition of intelligence, the overall state of intelligence theory, obstacles to success in intelligence, and the politics of the CIA. These works, however, largely focus on intelligence in policymaking and barely mention CI, no doubt reflecting the interests and experiences of academic specialists and also the practical obstacles to research created by the secrecy and mystery inherent in CI. Indeed, only two articles specifically on counterintelligence theory seem to have been published in the past few decades, and neither is a thorough treatment of the subject.¹²

What follows is an effort to begin developing a theory of counterintelligence. My purpose is not to present a fully formed theory but, rather, to take the first steps toward building one by considering what a theory would need to cover. Viewed that way, this article may be thought of as an answer to the question, "What are we talking about when we talk about CI?" I begin with an explanation of the benefits a theory would bring to CI work, then define counterintelligence, break down its various aspects, and finish with suggestions for further research for building a theory. This structure reflects my belief that counterintelligence is primarily an analytic discipline, which in turn centers on the study of intelligence services. Much of what I will put forward is based on my observations during a decade of work as a CI analyst and manager at the CIA, discussions with intelligence officers from the United States and other countries, as well as my classified and unclassified reading in the field.

¹ Vincent Bridgemen, "Defense Counterintelligence, Reconceptualized," in Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., *Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2008) and Stan Taylor, "Definitions and Theories of Counterintelligence," in Loch Johnson, ed., *Strategic Intelligence, Volume 4: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007).

Theory is an important building block for intellectual disciplines, whether in intelligence or any other field.

Why Theory?

Intelligence officers generally are practical people, concerned with achieving concrete results for their customers. They usually are uninterested in theories which, in their view, do not offer immediate help with their work. Nonetheless, theory is an important building block for intellectual disciplines, whether in intelligence or any other field. Specifically, a well-developed theory will offer:

- *A framework for understanding and explaining a subject.* This includes not only an overall definition that bounds the field of study, but also a way to break it down into smaller, manageable parts that, in turn, can be clearly defined and understood. The definitions also provide a common vocabulary for those working in the field, thereby ensuring that they can understand each other.
- *A way to model expected behavior.* As economic and political models demonstrate, theory enables the building of models of how people or institutions can be expected to behave in given situations. Even though they simplify and generalize, models can be tested against real-world data and their predictive values further refined.

- *A way to identify gaps in knowledge.* By systematically describing a topic, we not only can catalogue what we know about it but, just as important, find out what we do not know. These gaps can then become objectives for data collection, as well as new areas of study for analysis.

Definition

Generations of undergraduates opened their economics textbooks on the first day of class and learned from Paul Samuelson that economics is “the study of how societies use scarce resources to produce valuable commodities and distribute them among different people.” This is almost ideal as a definition—it is short and precise, but also flexible enough to cover almost anything that someone interested in the subject might want to study. Although many definitions of counterintelligence exist, to date no one has defined it in such succinct terms. (For a sample of definitions, see box on facing page.) With a goal in mind similar to Samuelson’s, I propose the following definition of counterintelligence:

Counterintelligence is the study of the organization and behavior of the intelligence services of foreign states and entities, and the application of the resulting knowledge.³

This definition has several advantages. Foremost, it acknowledges that counterintelligence is an analytic discipline. The definition also is broad enough to include any national-level intelligence service, whether foreign, domestic, technical, or military. It can also include lower-level intelligence services, such as those belonging to provinces or police departments. While this article will concentrate on the discussion of national-level services, the definition includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and thus brings the intelligence activities of terrorists, criminal gangs, as well as traditional NGOs, into the field of study. (While counterintelligence traditionally has been a state-sponsored activity, the definition allows nonstate actors—or even academics—to carry out CI.) Finally, the definition avoids making the study of intelligence services purely a research exercise. Indeed, applied counterintelligence has an important role to play in policy decisions, as well as intelligence operations.

The Study of Intelligence Services

The foundation of all counterintelligence work is the study of individual intelligence services. This is an analytical process, whose goal is to understand service behavior—that is, how services define and carry out their missions. Every service has its own distinctive behav-

ior, as even a cursory comparison of services will show.

Studying their behavior has the potential to provide a range of useful insights: such research may shed light on the roles a service may play in a country's foreign policy decision making, its internal politics, or how its components and officers may be expected to act operationally. These findings would be useful to both policy and operational consumers. Conducting such analysis, in turn, requires examining the major factors that govern service behavior, a process that starts with identifying the type of service under

examination and then proceeds to look at how the service's mission is defined, the external and internal political environment, its history, and the people who staff it.

Types of Intelligence Services

The first step in studying any intelligence service is to categorize it. There are three types of intelligence services—external, internal, and unitary.

- External, or foreign, intelligence services focus on targets and operations outside their country's borders (or sponsoring organization), with

the primary goal of collecting secret information about the capabilities of foreign states and entities. External services may be civilian, military, or technical. Their operations at home almost always are limited to targeting foreigners who are either residents or in transit. Examples of civilian external services include the CIA, Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and the Russian SVR. Well-known military intelligence services include the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Russia's GRU. The US

What is Counterintelligence? Competing Definitions

The term "counterintelligence" means information gathered, and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons or international terrorist activities.—National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 USC 401a)

Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.—Executive Order 12333

Counterintelligence is the business of identifying and dealing with foreign intelligence threats to the United States. Its core concern is the intelligence services of foreign states and similar organizations of non-state actors, such as trans-national terrorist groups. Counterintelligence has both a defensive mission—protecting the nation's secrets and assets against foreign intelligence penetration—and an offensive mission—finding out what foreign intelligence organizations are planning to better defeat their aims.—Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive

CI can be defined as the identification and neutralization of the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and the manipulation of those services for the manipulator's benefit.—Roy Godson

Counterintelligence is the broad subset of intelligence focused on the intelligence efforts of a competitor. The core of the mission is about understanding and exploiting a competitor's reliance on intelligence.—Vincent Bridgeman

Counterintelligence Activity. Activity conducted by special state agencies against foreign intelligence services and organizations and individuals being used by them.—KGB, via Mitrokhin

Counterintelligence is detective work, but of a highly specialized kind, focusing on operational detail in a secret world where meetings are arranged and held, and messages and intelligence information are exchanged, in a way meant to conceal the fact that they have ever occurred.—Frederick Hitz

Counterintelligence is to intelligence as epistemology is to philosophy. Both go back to the fundamental question of how we know things, both challenge what we are inclined to take most for granted.—Thomas Powers

Differences in the conceptions of their missions, as well as the political, social, and historical contexts of services have led to widely varying behavior.

National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are leading technical intelligence services that concentrate on foreign targets.

- Internal, or domestic, intelligence services operate against targets within their borders or sponsoring organization, with the primary mission of identifying and countering threats to the security of the host state or entity. These threats include the intelligence operations of other states or organizations, domestic political subversion, and terrorism. Internal services are almost always civilian, and their operations abroad are limited and often dominated by liaison work. Some of the best-known internal services are the FBI, the British Security Service (BSS), the French DCRI, Russia's FSB, and the Israeli Shin Bet.

- Unitary services combine internal and external intelligence functions in one organization. Historically, most unitary services have existed in totalitarian states, where their far-reaching capabilities made them effective instruments of repression. One of the most important functions of the Soviet KGB and the intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact states was to

crush political dissent; when the communist bloc regimes collapsed, the successor governments quickly split their services and abolished the internal service's political role. Today, unitary services, such as China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), mostly are found in the few remaining communist states. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), however, are examples of how limited resources and a relatively benign external security environment sometimes make a unitary service a sensible option for a democratic state.

Factors Determining the Behavior of Intelligence Services

It is tempting to assume that similar intelligence agencies will behave in the same ways. After all, if external services all have the same basic function, it stands to reason that there will be little difference in how they organize themselves, prioritize their tasks, and conduct operations. This view is not entirely inaccurate. Because of the similarity of their work, services tend to have similar internal structures and use many of the same operational methods. But this disguises important distinctions among services, as a quick comparison of the BSS and Shin Bet or the CIA and SVR will reveal. Differences in

the conceptions of their missions, as well as the political, social, and historical contexts of the services have led to widely varying behavior among them and are important to understand in any analytic effort.⁴

Definition of the mission. At the broadest level, an intelligence service's mission is defined through political and legal processes that set the goals of the service and the limits of its powers. Until the 1970s, services commonly were free to set their goals with minimal government supervision and had few legal limits on how they carried out their work. Since the mid-1970s, however, the trend has been for governments to institutionalize and limit the powers of their services by writing laws that define their missions and authorities, especially with regard to areas involving civil liberties, such as the use of electronic surveillance.

This movement began in the United States, where the post-Watergate revelations of CIA and FBI wrongdoing led to the establishment of congressional oversight, and the need to clarify the rules for electronic surveillance led to the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. Later in the 1970s and 1980s, revelations of political interference and civil liberties violations by domestic services in Australia and Canada, and the *Spycatcher* affair in the United Kingdom, led these countries to

pass legislation placing their services on firm legal foundations (MI-5, the forerunner of BSS, had been operating since 1909 without any statutory authority) and setting rules for their operations.

- The CSIS Act of 1984 was typical of such laws. It defined the service's mission—"the Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada"—and specified procedures for obtaining warrants, protecting civil liberties, and establishing public accountability and oversight.
- The process accelerated during the 1990s, when states as varied as the newly democratizing countries in Eastern Europe, Russia, South Africa, and Israel all passed similar legislation to define their services' missions, powers, and oversight.⁵

Counterintelligence analysts should carefully study the legal contexts of services, for these have the potential to affect service performance significantly. In fact, intelligence scholars have found that effective oversight and enforcement of the laws and regulations governing a service can help it meet high standards for conduct and performance, while poorly struc-

A service that works within a clear set of laws can expect to build public confidence in its performance—and receive public support—as well as to improve its self-confidence.

tured oversight harms service performance. The laws and regulations developed during the past three decades have focused most on domestic services, whose activities naturally raise more civil liberties concerns for democratic government than those of external services operating abroad.

As much as domestic services may complain about constraints on their powers or the time lost obtaining warrants, having clear and well-enforced rules reduces uncertainty for both the service and the general population. As long as they act in accordance with the laws, for example, domestic services know that the evidence they gather will hold up in court and cases will not be lost because of procedural mistakes, while civilians will have less fear that a service is acting beyond its authorities. Service leaders, for their parts, know that if they follow the rules, their own liabilities are minimized; in the event of a flap, they may be fired but they will not go to prison. Over the long term, therefore, a service that works within a clear set of laws can expect to build public confidence in its performance—and receive public support—as well as to improve its self-confidence.⁶

Because their governing laws provide only broad guidance,

services are left to decide for themselves what they will try to accomplish on a day-to-day basis. These decisions, in turn, depend on their understanding of their governments' strategic positions, threat perceptions, and policies, as well as the services' own goals and available resources. For most services, internal and external, the result is that they focus their efforts on just a few critical capabilities and issues.

- Internal services today often make counterterrorism their highest priority, leaving comparatively few resources to monitor other security threats. In these cases, they often ignore foreign intelligence activities that do not pose immediate threats to their government's interests. I know of one major service, for example, that devotes almost all of its efforts to counterterrorism and monitoring local Russian intelligence activity, leaving almost no resources for other CI work.
- Only a handful of external services—the CIA, SVR, and, to a lesser extent, SIS, French DGSE, and Mossad—attempt to cover the world. Almost all other services concentrate on their immediate neighbors or regions. These services usually are dependent on liaison relationships for information

Anyone seeking to understand or predict the behavior of a service needs to have at least a basic understanding of the political system in which the service is located.

on areas beyond their immediate neighborhoods, and often trade their regional expertise for what they require from globally capable services.⁷

Internal services, however, generally can adopt new missions faster than external services. With the advantages that come from legal and political support, while operating on territory that they know well and where they can openly appeal for (or compel) public assistance, domestic services can quickly shift resources and begin new operations, as many Western services did in the months after 11 September. In contrast, because they operate clandestinely on foreign territory and must hire and train officers who can work in alien environments, external services need much more preparation time for undertaking new missions. While external services can shorten this time, as the CIA did in September 2001, this tends only to happen in emergencies. In general, experience suggests that building effective capabilities for new overseas missions is a process that takes several years.

External and Internal Politics. Intelligence services are government bureaucracies, subject to the same political forces and tendencies as any others. Thus, anyone seeking to understand or predict the behavior of

a service needs to have at least a basic understanding of the political system in which the service is located. In a democratic state, as numerous cases from the past few decades attest, political or other external events can have enormous consequences for services, even when the services are not directly involved or responsible. The end of the Cold War, to cite an exceptional case, led to drastic cuts in the size and capabilities of US and European services; the Asian and Russian financial crises of the late 1990s led to budget cuts that devastated the capabilities of several major services; and recent intelligence failures, such as the 11 September attacks and the Iraqi WMD fiasco (which involved the services of several countries), brought not only public investigations and large-scale restructurings but also internal changes in how individual services collect and evaluate information.⁸

The political situations of intelligence services in authoritarian or totalitarian states are more difficult to determine. The absence of effective legal frameworks and the importance of personal networks over institutional relationships for government decision making make it difficult for outside observers to see what is going on. Examples from the history of communist

bloc services, however, suggest that in authoritarian and totalitarian states the positions of their services may be paradoxical. The dependence of such regimes on their services for repression, the integration of the services into the governing apparatus, and the absence of any outside check, provide the services with immunity from external inquiries and pressure for reform. At the same time, however, should the leadership perceive a serious failure or disloyalty within its services, the punishments are likely to be far more harsh than in democracies—jail terms and even executions are not unknown.

Even as they are acted upon, however, intelligence services work diligently to protect and advance their interests. The result is that services are almost always engaged in complex, multifront political struggles. The most basic of these is the constant effort to gather more resources—people, funds, and influence over decision making—from their political superiors, and to resist externally imposed changes.

Inevitably, a country's services are forced to compete with one another, and each seeks to gain an advantage by claiming credit for successes, denigrating rivals, or taking away cases. The conflicts between the CIA and FBI, CIA and DIA, MI-5 and SIS, the KGB and the GRU (and now the FSB and SVR) are well-known examples of this phenomenon and suggest that

bureaucratic conflict between intelligence services is the norm, even as political leaders try to force them to cooperate.

- The conflicts do not appear to extend to eliminating competitors, however. Internal, external, and military services are specialized enough and have enough separate consumers so that they do not try to take over each other's roles. (Governments sometimes merge services, as the French did with their internal and police services to form the DCRI in 2008, but the fear of unitary services limits this to combinations of similar services.) Their attacks tend to be on the margins, especially as they try to claim primacy on a case or specific issue, and this behavior seems opportunistic rather than systematic.⁹

In addition to interservice rivalries, services are prone to internal bureaucratic fighting. The complexity of intelligence organizations and their work provides many potential flashpoints, such as turf battles and disputes regarding primacy for specific operations, arguments about tradecraft, analytical disagreements, or straightforward budget fights. These battles can be as bitter as any with another service, if only because the participants know each other well and, because they see each other every day, can easily keep score. As with interservice rivalries, this behavior is normal and to be expected.

The complexity of intelligence organizations ... provides many potential flashpoints, such as turf battles and disputes regarding primacy for specific operations, etc.

History and myths. Every service celebrates its past, and its views of these times can have important effects on its contemporary behavior. Services often have achieved the most in times of national crisis, and tales of their feats of daring, undertaken without regard for bureaucratic formalities, can serve to inspire and socialize new recruits into their cultures. History is also accompanied by myths, which can enhance the glories of past deeds and also be used to bury the less heroic episodes. Thus, the CIA still takes great pride in the exploits of the OSS, but makes little mention of the Soviet agents who penetrated it. For the Mossad, the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann, Eli Cohen's operations in Syria, and its post-Munich assassinations of terrorists have achieved mythic status, but the service probably says little about its botched operations, such as when it has killed the wrong person. Mossad's case also is a good example of how history influences current behavior. Its heritage has given Mossad an operational outlook that encourages risk taking to the point of recklessness—the Pollard and Franklin cases demonstrate that it is willing to undertake operations that have the potential to create political disasters that far outweigh the intelligence benefits.¹⁰

Studying a service's old cases and methods also provides windows into current operations. The best example of this comes from the Russian services, as their operational history, beginning with the Czarist Okhrana and continuing through the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, is one of remarkable continuity. The Okhrana, for example, pioneered the use of penetrations and agents provocateurs in opposition groups, a practice picked up by the Cheka and used throughout the Soviet period.

- Today, the SVR continues to use illegals, officers who receive years of training and resource-intensive preparation to live overseas under false, non-Russian identities. This practice is another hold-over from the early days of Soviet intelligence, when the USSR had few legal intelligence establishments overseas, but in today's world probably produces no better results than any other clandestine methods. Nonetheless, the SVR proudly carries on this tradition.
- The FSB continues the practice, again begun by the Okhrana, of attempting pervasive internal surveillance. Like the Soviet internal security services, moreover, the FSB continues to be an obedient and ruthless tool the polit-

Internal and external services are remarkably inward looking.

ical leadership can use against its opponents, as the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko in 2006 indicates.¹¹

People. Finally, services are not robotic institutions but, rather, are staffed by hundreds or thousands of people who make and execute decisions. To my knowledge, there are no open-source sociological or comparative studies of intelligence officers, and I have found only one classified study, dating from 1983. Nonetheless, intelligence history, as well as personal observations, point to some hypotheses about the populations of services.

- External service officers tend to be from higher socioeconomic classes. The nature of their work—living and operating in other countries, posing as diplomats or businessmen, and interacting with political leaders at home and abroad—requires a university education, knowledge of foreign languages and culture, and confidence interacting with senior diplomatic and political officials. People with these characteristics likely will come from the upper middle class or higher; if of working class origin, they will have adopted such mannerisms and outlooks in school or during their training. The stereotypes of Ivy League CIA officers and Oxford- or Cambridge-educated SIS offic-

ers are rooted in fact, and the KGB (and SVR today) recruited many of its officers from Moscow's elite universities.

- Internal service officers tend to be from the working and lower middle classes. Their work is similar to police work and, as they carry out their duties on their home turf, street smarts are more important than a veneer of sophistication. Tellingly, according to Jeffrey Richelson, when Canada was preparing to move its internal security service out of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and into CSIS, the government worried that the transferees from the Mounties, with only high school diplomas, would lack the education and broad backgrounds desired for CSIS officers. Nor is it surprising that the FBI's Robert Hanssen, while he had a university degree, was the son of a policeman and started his career as a police officer in Chicago.¹²

One trait that internal and external services have in common is that they are remarkably inward looking. A look at almost any service reveals that except for the chief, no outside appointee holds a position of authority; the ambitious politicians, lawyers, think tank analysts, and academics who move in and out of almost all government ministries do not exist in

the intelligence world. As a result, services are staffed and run (again, except at the very top) by career employees. While this gives services solid foundations of experience and expertise, as well as officers who identify strongly with their organizations, it also isolates them.

In contrast to militaries, which prepare promising officers for high-level responsibilities by sending them to staff schools and civilian university programs, intelligence services have no schools or systems to provide advanced or mid-career training to their officers other than language classes or short technical courses. Intelligence officers often rise to senior levels with little exposure to outside ideas, which has consequences for the behavior of services.

- The management of services tends to be mediocre. In general, strong-performing case officers and street agents rise through the ranks and assume management positions. They usually receive no formal management training before taking these positions, however, and little systematic training afterward. As a result, services' mid- and senior-level managers often have little interest in overseeing critical administrative and planning details, or taking initiatives to change or modernize their services before a failure or crisis forces them to do so.

- Services are slow to innovate or learn from their errors.
- Examinations of the US Intelligence Community, for example, have found that longstanding organizational cultures created strong incentives against innovation, especially at the FBI, and that these contributed to the disaster on 11 September. Similarly, I am aware of at least one major foreign service that has been unable to address its chronic problems in vetting sources and reporting, despite years of effort.¹³

Applied Counterintelligence

Analyses of the behavior of other countries' intelligence services can be applied in many ways. On the policy side, CI analyses can help fill gaps in analysts' understanding of the political processes in other countries. For intelligence operations in general, understanding the workings of other services can be the difference between success and failure. This knowledge also is critically important for CI operations in particular, as well as for counterespionage investigations. Unfortunately, while a large amount of this information is available, potential consumers of counterintelligence information often either do not understand its utility or view it in such narrow terms that they fail to take full advantage of it.

Policy Support

Counterintelligence analysis can provide valuable informa-

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tion for use in policy deliberations, especially in issues involving authoritarian or totalitarian states. Because those regimes, unlike democratic governments, do not debate their policies in public, understanding the intelligence services and their practices can help analysts infer how their political leaders view the outside world. For example, collecting samples of raw reporting and finished reports enables counterintelligence analysts to judge the quality of the information a service gathers, its rigor in vetting reports, and whether it provides its customers with an accurate picture of the world, or distorted and politicized reports that serve only to support the leadership's preconceptions.

Such information can help political analysts, in turn, refine their judgments of how likely a regime is to make a potentially disastrous move because of its own misperceptions—certainly an important question in dealing with states such as North Korea or Iran. In other cases, the careful study of the history, operations, and personnel of a service can be critical in understanding how it may constrain or undercut its government's policies. The best recent example of this is Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISID), knowledge of which is critical to

understanding Islamabad's counterterrorism policies and how far it is willing—or able—to go in supporting US efforts.

Policymakers in democratic and authoritarian states use CI analysis differently, however. In democratic states, leaders tend to overlook the contribution that counterintelligence analysis can make to their decision-making. In many cases, as the WMD Commission noted, they view CI as either a law enforcement issue or an internal matter for their intelligence services, and pay attention to it only in the wake of high profile espionage cases, like those of the Walker family or Aldrich Ames.¹⁴

In my own experiences, I have noticed that policymakers often are unaware of the unique characteristics or activities of intelligence services that, as in the case of ISID, can have a large impact on US interests. Because of this, raising and maintaining policymaker awareness of the potential for CI to assist them is a constant challenge for analysts. (It says a great deal about US policy processes that the index for Christopher Andrews' book on US presidents' use of intelligence, *For the President's Eyes Only* (1995), has no entry for counterintelligence.)

Generalized counterintelligence training, while useful, does not bring with it expertise in specific services or aspects of CI work.

Leaders of totalitarian and authoritarian states, in contrast, are avid consumers of counterintelligence information. Always on the watch for spies and other security threats, real or imagined, they hunger for information on any plots that could threaten their rule. This was the case in the Soviet Union, up to the collapse of the communist state, as the KGB kept watch on all dissent and provided the leadership with detailed, if fanciful, reports on dissidents' foreign links. There is no reason to believe that the leaders of Syria, Iran, China, Russia, and North Korea today are any less eager readers of CI reporting.¹⁵

Operational Support

Services have long understood that CI plays an important role in their operations. Because of this, they train their officers in a variety of CI tools and methods. This generalized training, while useful, does not bring with it expertise in specific services or aspects of CI work. Indeed, CI officers often are case officers on limited tours and, while they learn much about the discipline and services, often move on without having gained great depth in the field. This is unfortunate, for the greater the available CI expertise on any given service or country, the greater are a service's chances of operational success against that target. Analyses of individual services,

especially, are important in every phase of an operation, even if the target is not an intelligence officer or service.

- *Planning.* Counterintelligence research and analysis are obviously important for operations aimed at penetrating intelligence services, as they enable operations officers to identify and target components and individuals. For operations aimed at other entities, however, CI research can provide important information about the relationship between the targeted organization and any intelligence services or officers charged with overseeing its security—the FSB, for example, has a presence in most Russian scientific and defense installations—and therefore inform planners about threats to the security of their operation.

- Similarly, operational planning requires an understanding of the CI environment where the operation is taking place; this, in turn, necessitates research to determine the capabilities and potential vulnerabilities of any services that may be present.

- *Operational vetting.* Counterintelligence analysis already has a well-established role in vetting operations and assets. Beyond monitoring individual cases to ensure their security and the validity of assets,

however, counterintelligence analysts can make a broader contribution by comparing a particular case with other, similar, current cases to discern patterns or warning signs that may not be evident from monitoring one case at a time. Similar results may be obtained by examining and comparing historical and present cases.

- *Lessons learned.* Every case, from the spectacular success to the complete failure, has its lessons. For this reason, CI analysts should review cases on a regular basis, and summarize any lessons they hold so that operational procedures can be modified as required. Even if the lessons simply confirm what we already know, this serves to ensure that our CI knowledge base is current.

Record keeping

This function is integral to CI support to operations, but it is often neglected. Every operation produces counterintelligence information, even if it does not target an intelligence service. This information can include case officer observations about surveillance and the local CI environment, an asset's off-hand remarks about security procedures or his identification of other intelligence officers, as well as small and seemingly insignificant details about how a service or other entities operate.

These details often are lost, even though they can be important to updating our knowledge about services and providing

baseline information for vetting future reporting. In many cases this is because CI information is not seen as the objective of the case and therefore is not formally extracted and reported; in other cases, because of compartmentation, the CI details first are not reported and then are forgotten and left irretrievable after the case has ended and the officers involved have moved on to new assignments.

To prevent this, counterintelligence specialists should continuously monitor cases and apply a comprehensive system for identifying, filing, disseminating, and retrieving CI information, thereby making it easily available to operations officers, investigators, and analysts. The lack of such a system has a high cost—MI5 let its CI recordkeeping slide during the interwar years, with near-disastrous results in 1939 and 1940—and, sadly, few such systems exist in the US Intelligence Community today. Indeed, my own experiences and discussions with colleagues at the CIA and FBI have convinced me that such record-keeping is spotty and agencies often cannot take advantage of the large amount of CI information in their case files.¹⁶

Counterintelligence Operations

Counterintelligence operations may be defined as operations undertaken to collect information about intelligence services. They are a specialized

CI operations are a specialized subset of intelligence operations in general and when successful can create endless feedback loops.

subset of intelligence operations in general and when successful can create endless feedback loops. Undertaking a counterintelligence operation requires the application of previously collected CI information—for example, it would be extremely difficult to target an intelligence organization without knowing how it is organized, what types of people work for it and how they are trained, and where they operate. All counterintelligence operations have the goal, therefore, of obtaining additional information about how the target service works and details of its operations that, in turn, can be used to refine the understanding of the service's behavior and then be used to feed another round of operations or investigations.

Broadly speaking, there are three types of counterintelligence operations. The first is the classic penetration, in which an officer of a service is recruited and provides information from within. Such an operation has tremendous potential. As the pseudonymous Christopher Felix wrote, a successful penetration “puts you at the very heart” of the target service, and “you are in a position to control [its] actions.” More concretely, a penetration may be able to identify spies in the service running him or other services; even if the penetra-

tion does not know the identities of any spies, he may provide pieces of information that can lead to their unmasking.¹⁷

Penetrations also are the best sources of information about the service itself. Even a low-ranking officer will know the service's organization, be able to provide biographical data on colleagues, hear about internal political squabbles, and can provide details on training and operational methods. He or she can also be tasked to fill gaps in reporting, as well as to learn if old reporting remains valid. Over time, a penetration may move up the ranks of the service and gain access to ever more important information, as Kim Philby did for the Soviets and Oleg Gordievskiy did for the British, though even mid-ranking penetrations can be devastating to a service if in the right spots, as was Aldrich Ames.

The second type of counterintelligence operation involves double agents. A double agent is one who appears to be working for one intelligence service but, in reality, is controlled by another. There are many types of double agents. One may be, for example, either an agent sent by one service to volunteer to another, or an asset of a service who has been discovered by a second service and turned—sent back to spy on the original

Unlike in novels or movies, spy hunts often take years as investigators pore over files and assemble fragments of evidence.

handlers. Another type of double agent operation is the dangle, in which one service makes a tempting target—say, a military officer, diplomat, or scientist—available to another service to recruit; the dangle behaves passively, allowing the target service to initiate contact and thus believe it has spotted, developed, and recruited an agent.

Both cases have the same goals: if the target service swallows the bait and accepts the agent as a genuine asset (or continues to have faith in a turned asset), the controlling service can learn the identities and vulnerabilities of some of the target's officers, its collection requirements, and tradecraft. These operations can also be used to feed disinformation to the target service as the double agent responds to taskings—in the best known case of this, the British in World War II turned all the German agents in England and used them in a massive deception operation to fool Berlin.¹⁸

In most cases, however, doubles and dangles have serious drawbacks. The service running the operation still is looking at the target from the outside and the value of the information it gains likely will be marginal. At the same time, the service must come up with a constant stream of material to feed to the target service, and

ensure that it is of high enough quality to encourage the target to keep running the agent rather than to terminate him. Doubles and dangles usually do not provide enough information about the target service to justify the effort.

The final type of CI operation is one that works systematically in a particular location to identify a target service's officers and then, through access agents or physical and technical surveillance, to uncover their activities and contacts. Such operations are rare, however, as it requires many months to identify adversary officers while recruiting, vetting, and training the access and surveillance assets; as the operation reveals more about the target and its assets, the operation grows and requires still more time, expertise, and resources.

The payoffs of this kind of effort, however, can be large. If a service gradually identifies the target's officers and assets, not only does it gain near-real-time information on how an opponent operates—ideally with the target service unaware that it is under close scrutiny—but it can also neutralize the threat from the target by using dangles and double agents or warning off his potential targets. In his memoirs, KGB counterintelligence officer Victor Cherkashin described just

such a situation in Beirut, recounting how the local Russian CI chief, Rem Krassilnikov had “set up a good network of agents and was running successful surveillance and eavesdropping operations” against the SIS. A similar operation by the CIA in Vienna resulted in the unmasking of State Department officer Felix Bloch as a Russian spy.¹⁹

Counterintelligence operations often are described as either defensive or offensive, but the foregoing shows that this is a false dichotomy. Penetrations, for example, usually are classed as offensive operations because the goal is to gain some degree of control over the target service. At the same time, however, a large reason for penetrating an opponent is to uncover any spies in your own service—certainly a defensive move. Similarly, a double agent operation can start as a defensive effort to identify another service's officers, but may eventually move to offense, as manipulating the target becomes the goal. As with an army's machine guns, all types of counterintelligence operations serve effectively on both the offense and defense, and it is misleading to try to classify them rigidly as one or the other.

Counterespionage

The final area of applied counterintelligence is counterespionage. Counterespionage, which may be defined as investigations or operations undertaken

to uncover a spy, is exceptionally difficult work. Unlike in novels or movies, where a dynamic hero finds the spy in a brief, action-packed period, spy hunts often take years as investigators pore over files and assemble fragments of evidence (the Ames investigation took nine years, and finding Hanssen ultimately took about 15 years). Nor is this a job for a lone operator—spy hunting takes experienced analysts, operations officers, technical specialists, lawyers, financial investigators, law enforcement officers, and psychologists, all working as a team. It also requires patience, attention to detail, and a high tolerance for frustration and ambiguity.²⁰

As with all other counterintelligence work, knowledge of service behavior is fundamental to counterespionage. Some of this is general knowledge of intelligence—how services target and recruit, the principles of running clandestine agents, evaluating conflicting information, and so on. But expertise on particular services or technical areas often is crucial, which means that, while skills such as computer forensics or accounting can be applied to cases across the board, most counterespionage officers still need to specialize in a particular service. The French, Chinese, Israelis, and Russians all operate differently, for example, and finding a spy from one of these services will be a different problem than finding a spy from another.

Successful counterespionage brings with it new or enhanced knowledge of the adversary.

Successful counterespionage brings with it new or enhanced knowledge of the adversary. When a spy is found, a service may observe his activities and learn how the other side runs him, or may double him and begin gathering information that way. When a spy is arrested and confesses (as most do), his interrogations will yield a wealth of information about the other side, as well as lessons for his own.

Areas for Further Research

Much work remains to be done in counterintelligence studies and theory building. We may know a great deal about the organizations and selected capabilities of the major intelligence services, but there are none for which we have a comprehensive understanding or catalogue of knowledge at our fingertips, especially beyond the English-speaking countries. Filling these gaps and working toward knowing the inner lives of services would do much to improve US counterintelligence operations and counterespionage capabilities, as well as help develop a theory of counterintelligence. This work will take many years, but work in several areas where relatively little research has been undertaken could quickly pay significant dividends.

The politics of services

Looking at the politics of services should be the highest priority for counterintelligence research. Understanding the internal and external politics of foreign services will give US analysts insights into their strengths and weaknesses, where they can help us or where they will try to harm us, and where we might be able to exploit internal conflicts or other weaknesses.

Service sociology

This is an area that could make a tremendous contribution to our CI operations. Understanding the people who make up a service—their class, ethnic, and social backgrounds, and their values—has the potential to make our own targeting and recruiting efforts more effective. Similarly, understanding the organizational cultures of other services can help identify weak points in their procedures that may provide us with operational openings.

Economics of counterintelligence

No one, to my knowledge, has tried to apply economics to counterintelligence. This is unfortunate, as economics has the potential to help answer some important operational and counterespionage questions. For example, labor economics can tell us not only how much a spy should be paid, but can also

Much work remains to be done in counterintelligence studies and theory building.

point toward incentive systems—signing and performance bonuses, retirement packages—that might make spying more attractive and hence bring us more volunteers. Similarly, behavioral and organizational economics might contribute to political and socio-psychological studies of services.

Comparative studies

Comparative studies of services is another unexplored field. How various services approach problems that all have in common—coping with political problems, internal security procedures, handling problems with counterpart agencies, how they react when they suspect they have traitors within their ranks—is another avenue for identifying strengths and weaknesses that we can use to our benefit.

Literary Studies

While reading spy novels is usually a leisure activity rather than part of the study of services, some espionage writers have much to say that is worth considering in CI work. Joseph Conrad's classic novel *The Secret Agent* (1907) has much to say about the role of ideology in intelligence work, and Graham Greene's *The Human Factor* (1978) is an excellent study of the motivations of spies—both should be required reading for counterespionage officers. John Le Carré's early novels, especially *The Spy Who Came in From the Cold* (1963) and *The Looking Glass War* (1965) also have valuable insights into CI tradecraft, the politics of CI work, and the bureaucratic workings of services.

A Final Word

As I noted at the beginning, this essay is only a start for the work of developing a robust theory of counterintelligence. The strength of its approach, in my view, is that it places analysis at the center of counterintelligence work but also makes clear the need for a multidisciplinary approach and integrates analytical with operational activities. Nonetheless, as a foundation for theoretical work it remains incomplete and, in an age when technology and nonstate actors have become important in world politics, probably is too human- and state-centric. With these points in mind, I hope others will contribute to the development of counterintelligence theory and help further develop what this article attempts to begin.



Endnotes

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“Peeling Facts off the Face of the Unknown”

Revisiting The Legacy: Sherman Kent, Willmoore Kendall, and George Pettee—Strategic Intelligence in the Digital Age

Anthony Olcott

To be “the father of intelligence analysis,” as Sherman Kent has so often been called, means of course that Kent was its founder, but it also means that his intellectual “genetics” lie deep within our enterprise. The Kent legacy has survived because his approach to intelligence analysis served the United States extremely well for a long time. However, as happens when environments undergo dramatic change, successful adaptations for one environment can prove to be much less efficacious—perhaps even fatal—in a new environment. One need only consider the doom hanging over the two professions that Kent held up as the models that he wished the “intelligence profession” to emulate—the “large university faculty” and “our greatest metropolitan newspapers”^a—to see how profoundly our environment has changed.^b

The views of Kendall and Pettee found little traction in their day but now seem to have important lessons for how the intelligence profession might change if those of us who practice it wish to escape extinction.

their day but now seem to anticipate in striking ways the vision of the future of the intelligence community published by the director of national intelligence (DNI) in 2008. This suggests the “paths not followed” have important lessons for how the intelligence profession might change if those of us who practice it wish to escape the looming extinction of the tenured faculty member and the professional journalist.

In addition to extinctions, though, profound changes of environment also can reveal the adaptive virtues in structures and approaches that did not thrive in the past. Kent had at least two contemporaries, Willmoore Kendall and George Pettee, who outlined quite different approaches to strategic analysis. Their views found little traction in

^a Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 74–5. Hereafter citations from this work are given in the body in parentheses.

^b For data on the decline of these professions see <http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/2009/> and Frank Donoghue, *The Last Professors* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009). What professors teach has changed dramatically, as well, particularly in the liberal arts curriculum that was the basis for much of Kent’s assertions about “the liberal tradition.” For more see Harold M. Greenberg, “Intelligence of the Past; Intelligence of the Future,” in Loch Johnson, ed., *Strategic Intelligence*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).

^c John Heidenrich does a cogent job of explaining the differences between tactical and strategic intelligence in “The State of Strategic Intelligence,” *Studies in Intelligence* 51, No. 2 (2007). He argues that strategic intelligence has essentially been forgotten by the IC.

Nearly every line of Strategic Intelligence derives from the conviction that for any situation, for every occurrence, for every phenomenon, there exists a single truth.

Things to Remember about Strategic Intelligence

Kent's best-known public work was prescriptive, not descriptive—that is, Kent wrote it from a kind of self-exile following the postwar dismemberment of his OSS research unit as part of the State Department's bureaucratic battle to retain ownership of intelligence. That Kent was describing not what existed as he wrote in 1947 but what he urged *should* exist places in context the attention he devotes to the nature of the intelligence

analyst and the relationship the analyst should have with the policymaker.^a

The policymaker, whom Kent dubbed “the consumer” of intelligence, was thus not so much an abstract entity as it was the foreign service officer who claimed superior knowledge of the countries in which he or she had served and thus agreed to use the products of Kent's research unit only to the degree that its findings coincided with

^a The date shows, for example, on page 172, where Kent speculated on whether or not Truman would try to be nominated for president in 1948.

that officer's previous understandings (Kent, 114). Kent's contempt for such consumers was withering: he cited Hitler as the prime example of a consumer who had “brilliant hunches” but who did not try to “analyze the why of his successful intuition,” preferring instead to see his intuition as a “natural, personal, and infallible source of truth” (Kent, 204).

What Kent saw to be Hitler's mistake—that the dictator had failed to probe more deeply—highlights another point about Kent: his view of reality was profoundly and unshakably Platonic. Nearly every line of *Strategic Intelligence* derives from the conviction that for any situation, for every occurrence, for every phenomenon there exists



The veterans of intelligence service during WW II who wrote about the role of intelligence in national strategy after the war: from left, Sherman Kent (1903–86), Willmoore Kendall (1909–68), and George Pettee(1904–89). Only Kent (shown in 1967 CIA portrait) remained in the field after the war to put his thinking into practice—he retired from CIA in 1967. By the time Kendall, a teacher and political philosopher (image courtesy of University of Dallas), critiqued Kent's book in 1949, he had been out of intelligence for two years. Pettee, an economist, came into wartime intelligence, like the others, from academe. He published his book on intelligence in 1946 while he was teaching at Amherst College. (The image above is from Amherst's 1947 yearbook, *Olio*.) Pettee went on to work in operations research in organizations associated with Johns Hopkins University. (Pettee photo courtesy of Amherst College Archives and Special Collections, by permission of the Trustees of Amherst College.)

a single truth. Kent states this assumption most clearly in a footnote, when he explains:

By "objective situation" I mean the situation as it exists in the understanding of some hypothetical omniscient Being. I mean the situation stripped of the subjective characteristics with which a prejudiced human observer is almost certain to endow it. I use the word "probable" because, whereas knowledge of the objective situation is of highest desirability, any non-omniscient Being (i.e., any frail human being) probably can never apprehend the true objective fact. He should, however, strive until it hurts [emphasis in original] (Kent, 41–42).

Discovering “true objective facts” is not only arduous, but it also is cumulative. As Kent wrote: “Research is the only process which we of the liberal tradition are willing to admit is capable of giving us the truth, or a close approximation to truth” (Kent, 155). The fruits of that research, and thus the policymakers’ ability to approximate the truth, were put badly at risk by the (to Kent) frivolous postwar “demobilization” of his research team. Kent used that term in “The Need for an Intelligence Literature,” which he wrote in 1955 for the inaugural issue of *Studies in Intelligence* in part to argue that intelligence was now firmly enough established to be considered a profession.

Kent gave three reasons for maintaining a space between analyst and policymaker, the most important of which was that “captured” intelligence analysts will end up “swinging behind the ‘policy’ of the operating unit”

It is worth unpacking what Kent meant. For one thing, a profession, unlike a job, requires special training and a period of tutelage. It is also not something for which all people are fit. “Twenty men with a mental rating of 5 put together in one room will not produce the ideas of one man with a mental rating of 100, and you cannot add minds as if they were so many fractional parts of genius.” (Kent, 174–75). A profession is also something in which people engage for reasons other than money—“People work at [intelligence] until they are numb, because they love it, because it is their life, and because the rewards are the rewards of professional accomplishment” (Kent, “Need”: 2).

More importantly, however, making intelligence analysis a profession also endowed the activity with self-justifying autonomy. It is the rigor of the selection process and the willing self-abnegation of its rewards that justify the most distinctive feature of Kent’s vision of strategic analysis—the strict separation of analysts and policymakers that remains a unique feature of US intelligence to this day. Kent gave three reasons for maintaining a space between analyst and policymaker, the most important of which was that

“captured” intelligence analysts will end up “swinging behind the ‘policy’ of the operating unit” and [thus be] “prostituting itself in the production of what the Nazis used to call *kampfende Wissenschaft* (roughly, knowledge to further aims of state policy)” (Kent, 200).

Kent Channeling Walter Lippmann

The source quoted to justify Kent’s remedy for the danger of “prostitution” is Walter Lippmann’s classic of 1922, *Public Opinion*.^a The passage that Kent cites, which explains that the only way to safeguard “impartial and objective analysis” (Kent, 200) is to keep the “staff which executes” as separate as possible from “the staff which investigates,” as “parallel but quite distinct bodies of men,” appears near the end of Lippmann’s book, in the section “Organized Intelligence.”

Just as Kent’s book was in many ways a reaction to his experiences during World War II, so was Lippmann’s a reaction to his during World War I. Although his blood was not

^a A version is available at: <http://infomations.com/etexts/gutenberg/dirs/etext04/pbpnn10.htm>.

Kent's analysts will have "horse sense," with "a set of well-stocked and well-ordered brain cells."

quite as blue as Kent's,^a Lippmann too was high-born and wealthy, a Harvard man to Kent's Yale, and just enough older to have been pressed into public service during World War I, as an unacknowledged adviser to President Wilson. Lippmann emerged from the experience with the paradoxical but not uncommon conviction that democracy is too good an institution to be trusted to ordinary people. The problem, he argued in *Public Opinion*, is that humans can only know well the things that lie in their immediate experience. Beyond that, their knowledge becomes increasingly second-hand, based upon what Lippmann termed "the pictures in their minds," which leaves them open to error or, even worse, makes them susceptible to outright manipulation.^b

The only way that America's policymakers might be kept reasonably on task, Lippmann argued, was to create "intelligence bureaus" that would serve in each of the government's 10 departments as permanent repositories of deeper knowledge. These "intelligence officials" (Lippmann's term) would be "independent both of the Congressional committees dealing with that department, and of the Secretary at the head of it" so that "they should not be entangled either in decision or in action." To ensure this freedom from "decision or action," these groups of "intelligence officials" would have tenure for life, "with provision for retirement on a liberal pension," regular sabbaticals, and could be dismissed "only after a trial by professional colleagues."^c

its roots in imperial Rome, where the things that men might know were divided into "arts and skills" (*techne* in Greek, hence "techniques" and "technology"), which were appropriate to slaves, and the intellectual realm of free men (*liber* = Latin for "free"), which included rhetoric, or the power of persuasion, and leadership.^d

For that reason, despite all of Kent's attempts to describe a system of intelligence analysis, what he advocates relies almost entirely upon a self-defining and self-policing elite that, because it engaged in the self-less struggle to draw ever nearer to truth, is not to be second-guessed by politicians or anyone else. To be sure, Kent's analysts were not to function entirely independently, but their relationship to policymakers was to "stand behind them with the book opened at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may neglect."

The Liberal Professions

Lippmann and Kent invested their intelligence professionals with so much autonomy because the Platonic model on which they both based their thinking was an innately hierarchical one. The "liberal tradition" to which Kent refers had

^a Kent's father, William, was a three-term congressman, while through his mother he was related to Roger Sherman, one of the five drafters of the Declaration of Independence. His uncle founded the Thacher School, in Ojai, California, and his family donated the land north of San Francisco which became the Muir Woods National Monument.

^b Lippmann also used the word "stereotypes" for those "pictures," repurposing a word that, until he changed it to what we mean today, had meant stock phrases that occurred constantly in a given kind of text and so did not require that typesetters set them anew each time, but rather just keep them as "stereotypes" ready to be slapped into place.

^c Lippman, chapter 26, part 3; taken from an online version, available at: <http://info-motions.com/etexts/gutenberg dirs/etext04/pbpnn10.htm>.

The analyst-policymaker model, as Kent makes plain, is that of "professional man" and "client" (Kent, 182). Just like the self-policing tenured "intelligence staff" that Lippmann envisioned, Kent's analysts will have "horse sense" (Kent, 164), with "a set of well-stocked and

^d There are many explanations of this point. A recent and quite readable one is W.R. Connor, "Liberal Arts Education in the Twenty-First Century," keynote speech at American Academy for Liberal Education, date not given: <http://www.aale.org/pdf/connor.pdf>.

well-ordered brain cells" (Kent, 65). They will be "wise men" whose "mysterious inner selves are of the kind which produce hypotheses of national importance" (Kent, 161) and, as such, are not to be confused with German or Soviet "party 'intellectuals' purporting objectively to prove such phenomena as Aryan Supremacy," as Kent wrote in a dismissive footnote (Kent, 200).

Analysts envisioned thus as "professionals," Kent can belittle the consumer who "insists that no idea is too complicated for the 300-word summary" because, by rejecting the deeper knowledge of the analysts, such a consumer is contributing to the "demoralization of his intelligence staff" (Kent, 176). The consumer who chooses to function without giving the analysts "sharp and timely guidance" is to Kent the main cause of "the worst sickness which can afflict intelligence," because "when intelligence knows little or nothing of what lies behind a request," the analysts "lose desire to participate," become "dumb and unhappy automatons" who "long ago...quit caring" (Kent, 183).

Most tellingly, Kent asserts that "pardonably wrong diagnosis and understandably inadequate presentation" must be forgiven, just as one might forgive "the dentist who pulls out the wrong tooth" or the "lawyer [who] loses a case" (Kent, 194) because "when the findings of

Kent asserts that "pardonably wrong diagnosis and understandably inadequate presentation" must be forgiven, just as one might forgive "the dentist who pulls out the wrong tooth"

the intelligence arm are regularly ignored, the consumer should recognize that he is turning his back on the instruments by which Western man has, since Aristotle, steadily enlarged his horizons—those of reason and scientific method" (Kent, 206). Indeed, Kent argues darkly, unless analysts are spared from all the normal rules, regulations, and considerations of their own efficacy, "the whole question of the preservation of the democratic way may itself become somewhat academic" (Kent, 147).

One Road Not Taken: Willmoore Kendall

Although Willmoore Kendall is one of four colleagues whom Kent thanks for "readings of the manuscript and many kinds of advice" (Kent, x), it is hard to imagine two men more dissimilar in their backgrounds and beliefs—no blue blood, Kendall was the son of a blind, itinerant preacher who had moved his family from Kentucky to Oklahoma, where Kendall was born.^a Self-taught, Kendall enrolled in university at age 14, won a Rhodes Scholarship, and nearly completed a PhD in

French literature before switching to political philosophy. His first book was on baseball and later works included a study of John Locke, articles on the poet John Milton, and a quantitative study of American voting behavior.

By all accounts Kendall was the antithesis of an "organization man," unable to stay on speaking terms with more than one colleague at a time, and—to judge at least by the transcripts of some his public presentations—savagely condescending to those he considered intellectually his inferiors, so it is unsurprising that Kendall played no discernible role in the formation of the CIA or the foundation of the "intelligence profession."^b

The one public instance when Kendall did lay out his thoughts on intelligence, however, makes clear that Kendall would have argued vigorously with Kent. Already back at Yale,^c Kendall reviewed Kent's *Strategic Intelligence* for the then-new journal *World Politics*.^d The review breaks into two parts. The first is devoted

^a Much of what follows is based on Jack Davis, "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," *Studies in Intelligence* 35, No. 2 (1991).

^b If the "Dialogues in Americanism" offered in Kendall's posthumous collection *Contra Mundum* is indeed the transcript of his comments at a debate with historian James McGregor Burns, Kendall would have been a terrifying person with whom to disagree. See *Contra Mundum*, 266–81.

Kendall argued, intelligence needs are strategic, because policymakers faced what Kendall called “the big job—the carving out of United States destiny in the world as a whole.”

to inconsistencies in Kent’s argument, or to places where Kent (in Kendall’s view) fails to draw out the full conclusion of what he has been saying. Many of these criticisms still resonate—Kendall agrees, for example, with Kent’s fear that the security requirements of covert collection would make overt collection difficult, but goes even further, to assert that “our present intelligence arrangements...enormously exaggerate the importance of covert collection, and yet permit it to yield shockingly small dividends.”^a It is in the second part of the review, however, that Kendall critiques what he sees to be Kent’s “state of mind,” which he argues has four major shortcomings (Kendall, 548–52).

First, Kent saw the intelligence needs of wartime and peacetime as essentially the same, which Kendall viewed as

a dangerous mistake. Wartime intelligence needs are primarily tactical—the enemy is known and the goal is clear—while in peacetime, Kendall argued, intelligence needs are strategic, because policymakers faced what Kendall called “the big job—the carving out of United States destiny in the world as a whole.” (Kendall, 548). This was not a matter of empirical fact, but rather of what Kendall elsewhere calls “ethics.”^b

Although Kendall obviously had views about what that destiny should be, he did not take the triumph of those views as a self-evident scientific “fact,” as did Kent. Rather he defined that destiny as a belief system which, he argued adamantly, was not the property of some

small, self-selected elite to establish, but rather was to be decided by what Kendall considered to be sole determinant of “right” in a democracy—the “one-half of the members, plus one” which constitutes the majority of any group. (Kendall, *Contra Mundum*, 93). The Kent “state of mind,” Kendall argues, views “the course of events” to be “a tape, all printed up inside a machine; and the job of intelligence is to tell the planners how it reads.” (Kendall, 549) Far better, he argues, to understand this course as “something you try to influence.”^c Kendall also rejected Kent’s division of intelligence into “domestic” and “foreign,” because that prevents analysts from examining how US actions might change a given situation.

The second problem with the Kent “mind set” was to see the business of government, and therefore of intelligence, as properly being conducted by professionals, the “producers” being the intelligence officers and the policy planners the “consumers.” To Kendall, this makes analysts “mere research assistants to the George Kennans.” Unlike Kent, the liberal elitist, Kendall was a “majoritarian,” a

^a This does not mean Kendall had no ties with the Intelligence Community. His name appears on a number of reports for the Operations Research Organization (ORO) until at least the mid-1950s. The subjects include an overview of China, a study of psychological warfare as waged by North Korea, and the sequence of questions to be used when giving Korean defectors polygraph tests. See precis of ORO reports at: <http://www.korean-war.com/Archives/2002/04/msg00152.htm>.

^b Willmoore Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence,” *World Politics*, Vol 1, No. 4 (July 1949): 545. Subsequent citations in text.

^a In a footnote to that remark Kendall contrasts open source collection to covert, arguing that “an intelligence agency in France” could learn far more about the United States from an airmail subscription to the *New York Times* than it might from four French agents sent to “dispense largesse in Washington.” He also speaks of how analysts might have “continuous and instantaneous access” to the “raw data of the developing situation in the outside world” by using “international telephone,” rather than rely on documents and reports forwarded from overseas, which, as he noted, “as a matter of course are out of date.”

^b See the essay “The Majority Principle and the Scientific Elite,” in Nellie Kendall, ed, *Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum*, (University Press of America, 1994), 93–102.

^c Kendall makes a useful distinction between unattainable *absolute prediction* (“General DeGaulle will come to power this day six months”) and the more desirable *contingent prediction*. (“The following factors, which can be influenced in such a fashion by action from the outside, will determine whether, and if so, when General DeGaulle will come to power.”) Kendall, 549.

deeply literal believer in democracy who saw the legitimate functions of US government as being performed by “the people,” as indicated by the majorities of voters who had elected their various representatives.^a

Although he had strong beliefs about what is moral and what is not, Kendall regarded his beliefs—all beliefs—as lying outside the “right-wrong” paradigm. “Rightness” is not in Kendall’s view to be determined by an elite corps of enlightened specialists, but rather by a strict majority. To Kendall, the true uniqueness, and the value, of America lay in the fact that it is as close to a genuine democracy as humans had yet produced—meaning that if you disagreed with a national policy, the proper route to changing it lay not in capturing control of a functional bureaucracy, but rather in convincing a majority of the populace to agree with you. Thus the minds in which the pictures should be changed belong to “the politically responsible laymen,” meaning the lawmakers, as well, presumably, as the minds of those who elect them. It is intriguing to imagine the arguments that Kent and Kendall must have had on this score when Kent defended his notion

Kent was a puzzle-solver.... Kendall, by contrast, was more of a mystery solver, who argued that belief systems are arbitrary constructions that can never be proven to be true or false.

that democracy could be preserved only by a non-democratic, self-selecting and self-policing elite.

The third shortcoming was Kent’s “crassly empirical conception of the research process in the social sciences,” a political scientist’s oblique dig at the historian’s tendency to equate intelligence value to volume of data. Kendall argued that the research process should also offer scope for “theory” as it is understood in economics and sociology” (Kendall, 551). In the “empiricist” world of Kent, the biggest challenge was to find better ways to “process” what Kendall called “a tidal wave of documents.” To Kendall, the challenge rather is to enable analysts to “work under conditions calculated to encourage thought.” Kendall points out that, although Kent makes many references in his book to social scientists and social science, he “never employs in that connection the words *theory* and *theorist*.”

The distinction Kendall was making comes quite close to what Gregory Treverton much later characterized as the difference between a puzzle and a mystery.^b Kent was a puzzle-solver—indeed, his signature gift to friends was a so-called

“buffalo block,” a handcrafted wooden puzzle that could only be taken apart, and reassembled, in one, and only one, intricate and precise way.^c Kendall, by contrast, was more of a mystery solver, who argued that belief systems are arbitrary constructions that—importantly—can never be proven to be true or false.^d As he wrote in one essay, “You cannot deduce from an *ethical* judgment...a canon of *scientific* proof,” because “Science tells us not what things to do but how to do things” (Kendall, *Contra Mundum*, 100–101).

Finally, Kendall accused Kent of “uncritical optimism” in assuming that there would always be adequate numbers to perform the tasks “upon which the intelligence function depends” (Kendall, 552). To Kendall, there could be “no more dangerous assumption.” In fact, Kendall argued, the supply of specialists “in fields other than History” (Kendall’s parting dig at Kent) was critically short, and would grow worse. What Kendall appears to have been arguing was that real “high-level foreign positive intelligence” was not an issue of

^a Kendall argued that America has two majorities, one which determines who will be president, and another, the composite of many smaller majorities, who make up the majority of elected representatives. The two are almost always—and should be—in opposition. See “The Two Majorities,” *Contra Mundum*, 202–227.

^b Gregory Treverton, “Risks and Riddles,” *Smithsonian*, June 2007.

^c Harold P. Ford, “A Tribute to Sherman Kent,” *Studies in Intelligence*, Fall, 1980.

^d This point is argued at some length in Kendall’s *The Basic Symbols of the American Political System*, Catholic University of America Press, 1970, reissued 1995.

It was not the errors of the past that drove Pettee's concern, but rather his certainty that peacetime would face the United States with even greater challenges than had the just-finished war.

fact-finding, but rather required coming to understand better how humans make and modify their beliefs.

Another Road Not Taken: George S. Pettee

Given Kendall's famously arrogant and contentious personality, it is little surprise that his views on strategic intelligence failed to gain traction. It is less clear, however, why the views of George Pettee were also left by the wayside as the US Intelligence Community was taking its present form.^a Just a year younger than Kent, George Pettee was yet another academic who got put to work in wartime Washington. Pulled from Amherst College's Department of Political Science, Pettee quickly rose to become chief of the European Enemy Division of the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), which provided industrial targets for Allied bombers and also tried to

limit enemy access to strategic raw materials.

In that sense, Pettee's wartime activities were similar to those of Kent, who had harnessed open source information to provide operational support to the invasion of North Africa. Unlike Kent, however, who came away from that experience convinced of the value that "objective facts" might offer to strategic analysis, Pettee emerged deeply skeptical of the value of such data—particularly after he could study the US Strategic Bombing Surveys^b that were produced to gauge the efficacy (or, quite often, lack of efficacy) of target recommendations made by him and his colleagues.

That skepticism informs *The Future of American Secret Intelligence*,^c which Kent acknowledged as "a trail breaker in the literature of strategic intelligence" (Kent, xi). To Pettee, the problem was not that the data he and his colleagues had provided was itself incorrect—they had more or less gotten right the amount of steel the Nazis

had produced, the oil they were consuming, and so forth—but rather that those figures had proven to be simply numbers that the analysts themselves had embedded into contexts and assumptions that in fact were completely wrong. As he wrote, "We won the war...in spite of, and not because of, the fact that our intelligence system showed many failings" (Pettee, 2).^d

It was not the errors of the past, however, that drove Pettee's concern, but rather his certainty that peacetime would face the United States with even greater challenges than had the just-finished war. Unlike Kent, who saw "Aryan supremacy" and similar doctrines as manifestly false beliefs that better data could disprove, Pettee was a student of revolutions,^e who had argued, even while an instructor at Harvard, that totalitarianism was a logical and attractive option that could be

^a Certainly Pettee was less colorful than either Kent or Kendall. He did appear to have an enthusiastic following at Harvard, his alma mater (PhD, 31), who objected when he was denied tenure, in 1941. See *The Crimson*, 13 March 1941 (at: <http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=463935>). Pettee's obituary suggests a productive but quiet life. See *New York Times*, 29 November 1989.

^b See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Bombing_Survey_\(Europe\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Bombing_Survey_(Europe)) and <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/index.html>

^c George Pettee, *The Future of American Secret Intelligence*, Infantry Journal Press, 1946. Hereafter, cites appear in text.

^d Pettee was even more insistent on this point in a lecture he gave to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1950, when he argued: "The Japanese underestimated us and most seriously underestimated our economy. The Germans underestimated our economy. They underestimated the Russian economy, and we know very well, also, that the Germans underestimated their own economy. We underestimated the Germans, the Japanese, and the Russians. The British underestimated the Germans, the Japanese, and the Russians." See <http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic1/L50-101.pdf>

^e His book, *The Process of Revolution* (Harper, 1938, reprinted Shenkman 1971) is cited by 46 other books and articles, according to Google Scholar.

battled only by overt government counterpropaganda—what he termed “conscious guidance”^a that could provide an even more attractive alternative narrative to those tempted by the blandishments of hostile ideologies.

Like Kendall, Pettee argued that beliefs exist separately from data. In a talk given to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in 1947, Pettee said that, in addition to their physical economies of production and trade, nations also have what he termed an “ethical economy”^b that can prove even more important than the other two kinds. In his book, Pettee asserts that it was the Nazis’ ability to *“predict and influence the process of events on the general economic-political-psychological level”* that determined their early success, while “we, at the time, were only surprised and dismayed by both the process of events and the apparent Nazi ability to control it” (Pettee, 29).

The peacetime challenge, of course, was Marxism, which Pettee saw as a “sociological weapon” that, despite being “about 80 years old today [in 1947]” is “more modern...than anything you have ever known”

^a Porter Sargent, *War and Education*, Boston, 1943, 249 (at): http://www.archive.org/stream/warandeducation09032mbp/warandeducation09032mbp_djvu.txt.

^b ICAF, 3 January 1947. At url: <http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic1/L47-063.pdf>

“Fundamental lack of doctrine [was a] notable characteristic of wartime intelligence agencies [and] remains...an outward indication of the fundamentally amateurish basis” on which strategic intelligence continued to be approached.

(ICAF, 9). Pettee warned that there is “a long record of American ignorance or misunderstanding of what makes world politics operate” that can no longer be tolerated if the United States is going to “accept active leadership of the world in seeking positive means to eliminate the causes of war” (Pettee, 39). Pettee warned that “Russia will do her best to use a modern approach to the problems which arise, to call her shots, and if we try to play our part without the tools of thought there will be no question of the outcome” (Pettee, 44).

Like Kent, Pettee saw the solution in research: “there is no case of failure [of policy in the interwar years] that cannot be fully explained by ignorance of economic and political facts and relationships” (Pettee, 44). But unlike Kent, Pettee argued that research, the gathering of facts, is useless if conducted separately from the functions of policy. As he wrote, “The failure to define clearly the special province of ‘strategic’ or ‘national policy’ intelligence...meant in the past that the conduct of the work lacked all the attributes which only a clear sense of purpose can give” (Pettee, 65).

Pettee also urged that intelligence analysis should become a

specialized activity, with its own school, case histories for study, professional association, and a journal (Pettee, 99–100). However, Pettee did not wish to see intelligence analysis become a profession, because he saw a more important task—the creation of “a doctrine for strategic intelligence” (Pettee, 97). Unlike a profession, which is self-justifying and self-policing, a doctrine depends upon outcome—as Pettee wrote, strategic intelligence analysis required “a doctrine of method, namely what data to seek as essential to the solution of a problem” (Pettee, 97).

Unlike Kent, whose analysts pursued subjects based on their own “horse sense,” Pettee warned that “individual initiative can only lead to disorder unless the individual understands the purposes and structure of the program in which he plays a part.... The remedy for misguided initiative must be through leadership from above and participation from below in a common doctrine” (Pettee, 97). It was the “fundamental lack of doctrine,” Pettee wrote, that was a “notable characteristic of wartime intelligence agencies” and “remains...an outward indication of the fundamentally amateurish basis” on which strategic intelligence continued to be approached (Pettee, 95).

Petree was even more specific about the necessity of linking analysis to purpose [than was Kendall].... "At the top is some kind of national brain taking in data...and making decisions."

Kendall, Petree, and Vision 2015

Petree did not share Kendall's disdain for the "George Kennans," the unelected bureaucrats of policy planning, but he did insist that strategic intelligence could only be as good as the policy-formation apparatus that sat atop it.^a In his book's final chapter, Petree argued that, even if "all of the problems of the actual processing of intelligence" that he details "can be given radical solutions," there still remains a final requirement, that there be "officials or offices in the government competent to act upon the conclusions." (Petree, 103)

Petree's words were different from those of Kendall, but he seems to have had something very like the "carving out of United States destiny in the world" in mind when he wrote that "the United States cannot have a national policy comparable to its commitments unless it has the means to form such a policy and base it upon the best possible knowledge of the facts

and circumstances" (Petree, 117). A government that could "find the truth in a situation, and could recognize the truth and act upon it when it found it" would be "less than a panacea," but it would be "a positive test and sign that democratic government could learn how to unify intention and consequence" (Petree, 118).

Petree was even more specific about the necessity of linking analysis to purpose in the talk he gave to ICAF in 1950, where he outlined an ideal view of how intelligence and policy should function together:


Up at the top is some kind of national brain taking in data on the situation, estimating the situation, and making decisions—the fundamental, high-level policy decisions.... There is a flow of information about the situation from the world to the general staff. That is the intelligence function.... There is also the research function, which is studying things distinct from what these other people study—and are distinct not because they are domestic, not because they are foreign, but because nobody knows them yet. They are peeling facts off the face of the unknown.... Research must provide intelligence with data, intelligence must provide research with data, and things have to correlate at lower levels.... If that cycle—

the flow of information, decision, command, and action—is rational, then you are using your resources to suit your purposes, and the consequences are coming out in accordance with your intentions. If the consequences are not coming out in accordance with your intentions, there is...a failure of function somewhere in that cycle.^b

The diagram Petree used to illustrate his lecture (facing page, above) bears a remarkable, and very suggestive, similarity to the depiction of the intelligence process offered at the end of the DNI's *Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise*, published in 2008 (see right). Although there are some differences in the details, both diagrams share the hierarchical but integrated relationship of analyst and policymaker that Kendall and Petree both advocated, and which Kent warned against. While paying lip service to the tradition of "speaking truth to power," (*Vision*, 8) the DNI's statement speaks of future intelligence analysis following "a more interactive model that blurs the distinction between producer and consumer" (*Vision*, 9) and that, rather than "asking customers, 'What are your intelligence priorities?' analysts will be expected to engage them

^a Indeed, at the 1950 talk Petree quipped, "There is another side to the old point that war is too important a matter to be entrusted entirely to soldiers. I think it is possible that, under the conditions we have reached, we can add: Peace is too important a matter to be entrusted entirely to civilians" (5).

^b 24 February 1950. At url: <http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic1/L50-101.pdf>



with, ‘what do you want to accomplish?’’ (*Vision*, 10)

Conclusion

There are many forces that are converging to bankrupt the professions of the tenured faculty member and the professional journalist, but all of them point in the same direction—that society no longer requires intermediaries to stand between it and knowledge, or it and events, to declare that one set of things (writers, ideas, faiths, political traditions, etc.) is good, important, and true, while all the rest is to be ignored. Although the connection has perhaps become obscured, both the university system, as practiced in the United States, and the US tradition of journalism (since at least the end of the 19th century) derive from the same set of Platonic assumptions as did Kent’s prescriptions for strategic analysis.

The reason that the Kent method worked so well for so long is that, in the bipolar world of the 20th century, the differences between tactical and strategic intelligence were not great. In the Cold War, the presumed enemy was almost as evident as had been the real enemies in the hot war from which Kent, Kendall, and Pettee had all just emerged, and the strategic purposes of intelligence thus seemed clear. Both Kendall and Pettee, however,

"Even if strategic intelligence is not exposed to public view, the officials who receive its advice will trust it and respect it in close proportion to its batting average."

understood that Marxism was not an error to be countered with better facts, or a “*kampfende Wissenschaft*” like Aryan Supremacy to be dismissed as evil foolishness.

If the world were indeed as Kent imagined it to be, with “objective situations” that could be discerned by “western man enlarging his horizons” through “reason and scientific method,” then strategic analysts should probably be the kind of academic, dispassionate elite whom Kent and Lippmann envisioned. It seems far more realistic, however, to accept that our current global terrain is like that in a quote provided by John Heidenrich, that we are in “a competition...for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population,” on a global scale.^a

For all their clear antipathy to the emerging Marxist opponent of their day, Kendall and Pettee saw the enemy not as one to be proven to be in factual error, but rather as one with which

we were in a competition “for hearts and minds.” What Kendall, and even more so, Pettee recognized in 1950 is that, in that kind of world, the ultimate measure of the strategic intelligence analyst is utility and result. In Pettee’s words, “Even if strategic intelligence is not exposed to public view, the officials who receive its advice will trust it and respect it in close proportion to its batting average” (Pettee, 91). The measure, in other words, is the efficacy of the function, rather than the purported inherent value of those who perform it.

The professions that Kent held up as models for the intelligence analyst—journalist and professor—are vanishing in part because the needs they once met no longer exist and also because competitors have appeared to meet other of those needs faster, cheaper, and in more accessible ways than can professors and the journalists. *Vision 2015* appears to recognize that the profession of intelligence analysis faces the same erosive pressures:

We confront the challenge of acting in an environment that is more time-sensitive and open to the flow of information,

in which intelligence sources and analysis compete in a public context established by a global media....

*The typical customer in 2015 will be a new generation of government decision-maker, accustomed to instantaneous support, comfortable with technological change, and unfamiliar with intelligence as a privileged source [emphasis added]. Such users will expect intelligence to provide customized, interactive support “on demand,” and will expect to be treated as partner—both a source of input and an ultimate intelligence end user (*Vision*, 5).*

It is not clear whether the profession of strategic intelligence will prove any more resiliency against that competition than have the professors and the journalists. George Pettee, however, at least provided a yardstick by which our progress, or lack of it, might be measured. As he warned, “The services which must be rendered to US policy by economic and political intelligence will be judged ultimately against the most drastic standards. If in coming years the consequences of American action correspond to American intentions there will be world peace and prosperity” (Pettee, 42).



^a Heidenrich, “The State of Strategic Intelligence,” citing David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles” in *Military Review* (May–June 2006): 103–8.

Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches

Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, Stuart Farson, and Shlomo Shpiro, eds.: Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008, 700 pp, index.

Reviewed by Michael Warner

Nations build different military systems to reflect their differing goals and needs in employing force against real and potential enemies. They build different intelligence systems for similar reasons, and thus, in the spirit of Clausewitz, we can ponder what it is that stays the same in intelligence systems across cultures and time periods. If we can find that, perhaps we can compare how and why intelligence systems vary over time, and how they vary from one another.¹

An international team of scholars has launched perhaps the most ambitious project to date for comparing intelligence systems. In their work, the *Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence*, 36 contributing authors have compared the intelligence systems of 30 nations in Europe, Asia, and the Americas (only one African system—South Africa's—could be included). The effort deserves praise for both the attempt and its results.

The editors of the *Handbook* asked their contributing authors to draft their chapters to speak to the effects of common factors that presumably influence all intelligence systems. The chapters are not comparisons per se; each describes one intelligence system, but the structure of the project allows for such comparisons to be made with greater ease. For this purpose, the *Handbook* explains that intelligence systems vary across national contexts according to two variables: "Strategic Environment" and "Regime Type."

The *Handbook's* method produces useful evidence that is both contemporaneous and orderly thanks to the authors' attention to these two variables. The Strategic Environment variable is a serviceable proxy for a nation's "grand strategy"—its posture toward countries that can help or harm it. States are never themselves wholly independent actors in international affairs; indeed, much of what they do on a daily basis is caused or conditioned by real and imagined events and trends around them. Still, one wishes the editors had expanded the Strategic Environment variable—or added a third variable—to account for the geopolitical goals and aspirations of a nation's leaders. While many national lead-

¹ An intelligence system can be thought of as the collective authorities, resources, tasks, and oversight assigned to officials who are seeking to inform and facilitate a regime's objectives by fragile and provocative means.

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ers may feel themselves swept along by historical tides, there have been some important ones who saw their nations as shapers of history. How did they wish intelligence to serve them in their projects? A few of the *Handbook's* authors bring such considerations into their essays on national intelligence systems, but if it is important enough to consider in some essays, then perhaps it is important enough for them all.

The *Handbook's* employment of Regime Type as an independent variable is overdue among works of intelligence theory. This seems likely to become a key field of inquiry for intelligence studies as they expand outward from studying the Anglo-American systems and those in the Western orbit. As with the Strategic Environment variable, however, I would add that the *Handbook* could have done more. Peter Gill and Mark Phythian have elsewhere observed that nonstate actors (at least those disposed and prepared to use lethal force) practice intelligence as well. It follows that intelligence systems in states and some nonstate actors can be compared with one another. And yet, the work done to date, and in the *Handbook*, comprises almost entirely descriptions of state-based systems. The exceptions—for European counterterrorism cooperation and for the Palestine National Authority—make a promising start in the direction of examining intelligence in nonstate sovereignties. If we posit that nonstate actors can employ intelligence methods as skillfully and ruthlessly as some states, then we must broaden the aperture in successor projects to consider nonstate intelligence systems as well.

The *Handbook's* only real lack is that of sustained attention to how technology factors into different intelligence systems. The way in which a regime orders and practices intelligence has a great deal to do with its technological environment. Changes in technology, by altering both the threats to the regime and opportunities available to it (for economic, military, and intelligence pursuits), have direct and indirect effects on a regime's intelligence work. Technology, in short, helps to determine the objects of intelligence *and* the means that intelligence employs. In consequence, it also helps determine the numbers and sorts of intelligence officers hired to mount operations and to collect and analyze data, the ways in which those officers are tasked and organized, and the methods by which they can disseminate information to decisionmakers. The *Handbook* offers a snapshot of these changes in midstride, without really explaining how technology has and is likely to reshape intelligence systems. Today the digital revolution makes all sorts of intelligence much cheaper; small states and nonstate actors can now practice espionage and covert action against the largest states, with comparatively little expense and less risk to themselves. This development makes the study of how nonstates organize and task their intelligence systems, as noted above, all the more important.

The *Handbook* represents a big step forward. It is a valuable set of cross-national comparisons of intelligence systems informed by intelligence theory and centered around significant independent variables. It cannot be the last word on this subject, but it represents progress toward true comparisons of intelligence systems—one that both the historians and the political scientists, and devotees of other disciplines, may well wish to join. With the addition of a technology variable—particularly one that can explain the trajectory of the revolution caused by digitization—sequels to the *Handbook* will be even more useful.



Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates

Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian, eds., New York: Routledge Press, 2009. 252 pp, incl. bibliography and index.

Reviewed by J. M. Webb

Improving national intelligence is something all can agree is important. Better intelligence enhances security and prosperity and, one hopes, helps create a safer world. In the wake of 9/11 the number of articles, books, and blogs on intelligence has soared, but very little has been groundbreaking.

One wishes that *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates* (produced by the Routledge Press Studies in Intelligence [no relation to this journal] series) had offered more than it does. The 13 contributors to this collection of 12 essays are prominent scholars of intelligence—their collected works would fill a bookcase, a number have published articles in this journal, and their teaching credentials are solid. They have been struggling with this topic for some years now. Many were participants in a workshop on the subject of intelligence theory sponsored by the director of national intelligence in June 2005.¹ Most, if not all, as members of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association, have turned this nut over and over in annual meetings of the association since then.

The work's goal, as it is described in this volume, is worthy: The writers hope to formalize the study of intelligence with the goal of influencing US intelligence policy and educating the public about intelligence issues (212–13). They call for a lasting academic discipline of intelligence, which is sorely needed, and hope to lay a solid foundation for general theories that will, in their words, “explain intelligence as it is practiced everywhere” and that will be seen as “relevant by scholars wherever they are based” (1–2; 209).

In this attempt, they join a long historical line of scholars and intelligence professionals who have studied the field of intelligence. In addition to the classics—Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, Thucydides's *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Machiavelli's *The Prince*, Clausewitz's *On War*—modern scholars like Klaus Knorr in the 1960s and Walter Laquer in the 1980s, made the case for intelligence studies and called for theories of intelligence.² Because intelligence literature itself is mostly historical—covering things like the development of intelligence services,

¹ Gregory Treverton, et al., *Toward a Theory of Intelligence: A Workshop Report*, (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2006).

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collection methods, use of intelligence, operations, how technology fits into intelligence, differences between intelligence and counter intelligence, intelligence analysis, and of course “intelligence failures”—intelligence theories have long been sought. Less common has been the kind of effort made in this volume to consciously assemble a collection of writings to serve as a foundation for an intelligence discipline. Yet, as the book’s inconclusive subtitle, *Key Questions and Debates*, suggests, four or more years of cogitation has not led to a coherent theory, and as much as the attempt is to be applauded, it is clear that efforts need to be redoubled—or at least more sharply focused.

How does this work fall short, then? First, the essays demonstrate that, after years of thought, scholars are still struggling with definitions. The volume opens with discussion of definitions in chapters by historians David Kahn and Michael Warner. In “An Historical Theory of Intelligence,” Kahn concludes simply that it is information of one form or another. Michael Warner, in a contribution that replays his 2002³ review and synthesis of the problems of defining intelligence, introduces greater complexity and highlights the existence of an “impasse” over contradictory definitions that is far from over. Not terribly helpfully, however, he goes on to assert that “arguments over the definition of intelligence resemble perhaps nothing more so much as a trademark dispute” (17). Students of intelligence understand how problematic this is. Warner himself states, “Without a clear sense of the dependent variable in the equation, we find it difficult to understand which independent factors cause and affect intelligence phenomena” (17). Later, Peter Gill agrees, writing, “If we cannot agree on what we are discussing, then we shall struggle to generate understanding and explanation in an important field of political and social activity” (213). Unfortunately, Gill doesn’t help either by opting to lay out another definition instead of working with those that had been tabled in other essays (217–19).

Second—perhaps because too many of the essays in this collection are attempts to boil down full-length books never really intended to deal with specific questions of theory—the debate promised in the subtitle never really takes place. Instead, the authors essentially talk past each other. For example, several contributors outline elements of what might serve as building blocks for the field, but the arguments advanced tend to contradict one another or stress sharply differing approaches without explaining why one approach is superior to another. At the same time, authors appear to undercut their own arguments. Principal editor Mark Phythian writes that intelligence studies (IS) needs to “establish itself as a distinct subject area,” but he goes on to say that traditional international relations (IR) theory on “structural realism” provides a “theoretical basis for addressing key [intelligence] questions” (61). As a subset of IR, then, what is the benefit of IS? In their chapters, Richard Betts, Glenn Hastedt, and B. Douglas Skelley argue for an organizational theory approach to the subject. James Shep-

² Klaus Knorr, *Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences*, Research Monograph No. 17, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), Walter Laqueur, *A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence* (New York: Basic Books, 1985)

³ Michael Warner. “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence,’” *Studies in Intelligence* 46, No. 3 (2002). From Warner’s earlier work, “intelligence is secret state or group activity to understand or influence foreign entities.” Rob Johnston makes a slight but useful modification by adding that the activity is focused on domestic entities in addition to foreign ones—in *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005).

tycki (167–80) then suggests sociology can serve as an alternative theoretical base for intelligence studies. Here, again, the authors don't really debate the costs and benefits of these different approaches, let alone lay out what should be the key elements of the debate. Nor do they present a breadth of evidence from around the world to support their cases.

Third, *Intelligence Theory* focuses too narrowly on failure. Phythian argues that the “core focus” of the study of intelligence “should be on the causes of intelligence failures” (62). Betts, Hastedt, Skelley, Jennifer Sims, and Loch Johnson all focus on explaining intelligence failures. None of these authors does any stocktaking to illuminate how prevalent intelligence failures are. So it's impossible to know if failures are the exception or the norm in intelligence activities, nor is there an attempt to assess the importance of failures in general. This work has been done to some extent by two former intelligence officers. Richard Kerr, a former deputy director for intelligence and deputy director of CIA, wrote in a chapter in *Analyzing Intelligence* that in his survey of CIA analyses from 1950 to 2000 he found that CIA had more analytic successes than failures.

In the same book, Jack Davis argued in addition that “little is made publicly of the failure of analysts to anticipate favorable developments for US interests,” which suggests that not all intelligence failures have the same effect or matter equally. The Kerr and Davis essays suggest that in focusing on failure *Intelligence Theory* is highlighting outlier cases with limited utility in construction of an overall theory.⁴ To be sure, intelligence failures are important. They need to be studied, and we need to learn from them. But intelligence as an object of academic study should be far more dynamic and rich than just examination of failure. If scholars of intelligence, like those contributing to this book, want to inspire and establish a discipline of intelligence that will go beyond case studies of US intelligence, in particular of failure, a more robust set of questions and debates is still needed.



⁴ Richard Kerr, “The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950 to 2000,” and Jack Davis, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” in *Analyzing Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Gary Berntsen, *Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008), 136 pp., footnotes, bibliography, glossary, index.

A Practical Guide was written for “incoming presidents and White House staffs so they can master the subject of human intelligence and counterterrorism operations in order to deal with this twenty-first century world.”(xvi) This top down aim point is necessary, writes former CIA operations officer Gary Berntsen, because the still uncorrected leadership blunders that contributed to the Intelligence Community’s “failure to collect the dots” (xi) before 9/11 can only be put right at that level.

In 19 short chapters, Berntsen examines the operational and policy issues that need attention. His principal focus is on what is now called the National Clandestine Service—human intelligence—and its relationship with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. He discusses covert action, personnel restrictions, language skills, interrogation, WMD, state-sponsored terrorism, terrorist finances, and military special operations forces. Also included is a recommendation for a new “Freedom Corps” made up of Arabic specialists.

Each chapter concludes with a series of “critical points” that recommend presidential action. For example, a chapter on personnel states, “The president must make it a priority to understand the size and capabilities of the clandestine service on taking office and address any problems immediately.” (22) Similarly, a chapter on the polygraph contends the president and the Congress do not understand that the current polygraph policy does more harm than good. Berntsen makes a strong case that it should be used only for certain sensitive positions. (28) In the chapter on language skills, Berntsen suggests creating a new organization for the promotion of language study and a mandatory requirement that students at the military academies study a Middle Eastern language for four years. (50) On the policy front, he recommends, *inter alia*, that the United States “sponsor an Iranian government in exile.” (96)

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Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership relies heavily on the author's years of experience in the field and does not provide detailed analysis or supporting data. Whether he really expects a new president to act personally to make the changes he suggests is unclear. He does not discuss an alternative—giving the DNI the appropriate marching orders. In any case, Berntsen is convinced that “when it comes to intelligence and counterterrorism, presidential competence counts,” and that high level involvement is directly proportional to the success of his national security policies. (110)

Historical

Andrew Meier, *The Lost Spy: An American in Stalin's Secret Service* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 402 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In 2000, while researching a book on Stalin's gulag, *Moscow Time Magazine* correspondent Andrew Meier routinely asked former inmates whether they had encountered any American prisoners. The only one who did mentioned a man called “the American professor.” (10) From that clue emerged the story of Isaiah [Cy] Oggins, *The Lost Spy*.

Meier sees Oggins as a member of “the generation of intellectuals betrayed by ‘the God that failed.’” With the same facts, however, Oggins can also be characterized as a dedicated communist agent for most of his 49 years, though little is known about just what he did.

Born in Willimantic, Connecticut, Oggins attended Columbia University. He married another communist named Nerma Berman. After they formally joined the US Communist Party sometime in the 1920s, their offer of services to the USSR was accepted and they were sent abroad. Meier writes that Oggins lived first in Berlin under cover as an art dealer. Later they served in Paris, Shanghai, and Manchuria. By 1939, Nerma had returned to the United States, and Oggins was arrested in Moscow. During the eight years he spent in the gulag, Oggins met with American diplomats but declined to tell them the whole truth. (181) In 1947 he was sent to Moscow, where he was executed by lethal injection. Unfortunately, little more is known about Cy Oggins and the sketchy details Meier provides are not new.¹

It was not for lack of trying that Meier did little to resolve the mystery of Oggins's life as a spy. Meier located Oggins's 70-year-old son, who last saw his father when he was seven, but learned nothing about Oggins senior as a Soviet agent. The FSB (the KGB's successor service) gave Meier 39 pages of redacted files, about a quarter of the entire file. They apparently discussed Oggins's party membership, but Meier does not make clear just what they revealed. The same is true of the few FBI files Meier mentioned. Nerma Oggins

¹ Oggins career were first reported in Pavel Sudoplatov's memoirs but those were the recollections of an 85-year-old former KGB officer. Meier takes issue with some of Sudoplatov's account (pages 181–82) but cannot prove his case. See, Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 281–82.

released some photos and letters that dealt with her efforts to secure her husband's release. Meier also cites files covering the State Department's efforts in that regard.

In short, the book is a mix of speculation—"might have," "could have," "probably did"—about Oggins' life as a spy and historical filler about the KGB and the Communist Party in various countries. These weakness are best illustrated in Meier's intimate account of Oggins' arrest (3–5) for which no documents or eye witness testimony is cited. Peter Pringle wrote in the *Washington Post*, "*The Lost Spy* is a valiant effort, a well-written and rewarding romp through the international communist movement of the 1920s and '30s."² Nonetheless, he too observed that it is filled with surmises. The book's dust jacket claimed that Meier's effort would "rewrite the history of Soviet intelligence in the West," a gross and unsupported exaggeration.

Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of Sexspionage* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 368 pp., bibliography, chronology, index.

The prerequisites for writing a non-fiction book about sex and espionage might at first glance seem obvious. But two of the three books-in English-devoted to the subject were written by journalists. The first, *Sexpionage: The Exploitation of Sex by Soviet Intelligence*³ is narrow in scope and out of date. The second, *Sex Espionage*,⁴ tells a few stories from biblical times to the late 1980s, including a bizarre chapter on "Watergate: A Sex Cover-up." Neither is documented and both contain many unforced errors.

Intelligence historian Nigel West has overcome some of these discrepancies in his effort. His bibliographic essay deals with the notorious fabricators in this field and the more than 300 entries provide excellent coverage showing how these two callings can interact. The most obvious example is the *romeo spy* (241) where seduction is used to obtain secrets. West also includes instances in which the intimate relationships involved are incidental to the espionage. Some are well known, Mata Hari and Kim Philby, for example. Others, are relatively obscure: Linda Hernandez, Florentino Aspíllaga, and Hildegarde Broda (175), to name three. Broda, the wife of suspected Soviet agent Engelbert Broda, later married convicted Soviet spy Allan Nunn May, and is named here for the first time. Several entries only hint at a link to sexspionage specifics: Herbert Norman, Josephine Baker, and Edward Lee Howard are examples.

This leads to another group of entries in which the person named was not directly involved in any form of sexspionage but was in a management position responsible for a compromised operation, lawsuit, or security violation. Former DCI John Deutch is one example. Finally there are a few entries dealing with organizations, fictional characters—James Bond being the best known—technical matters, and behavioral issues as they related to espionage.

² Peter Pringle, *Washington Post Book World*, 24 August 2008, 4.

³ David Lewis (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

⁴ Donald E. Bower (Bloomington, IN: Knightsbridge Pub. Co., 1990)

There is one discrepancy *Sexspionage* shares with the other works on the subject: not a single entry is documented. For a dictionary that is more like an encyclopedia, this is not helpful and reduces its educational usefulness. There are also some simple errors that fact-checking by the publisher should have caught: Elizabeth Bentley was originally from New Milford, CT, not Rochester, NY; John Deutch is the correct spelling, not “Deutsch.”

Nevertheless, *Sexspionage*, while providing the most comprehensive coverage of the topic to date, confirms the conventional wisdom that sex and espionage are linked in the real world as well as in fiction. It does not, however, comment on its value as a tool of the profession—that judgment is left to others.

General Intelligence

William R. Johnson, ***Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to Be A Counterintelligence Officer*** (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009, 2nd edition), 222 pp., index. Foreword by William Hood.

Classics in any branch of the arts are less easily defined than recognized. When it comes to books on intelligence, one of the first that comes to mind is Sherman Kent's *Strategic Intelligence*. David Kahn's *The Codebreakers* is another. Both have a timeless, definitive quality and are strongly endorsed by respected professionals in their fields. *Thwarting Enemies* has earned classic status for the same reasons.

In his foreword to the book, former CIA officer William Hood summarizes Bill Johnson's long career in military and CIA counterintelligence (CI). In the 18 chapters that follow, Johnson begins by discussing what counterintelligence is and how it differs from counterespionage. He goes on to cover the traits of a CI officer, the support apparatus needed to do the job, the role of the polygraph, and how foreign counterintelligence is conducted when the officer doesn't have arrest powers. The chapter on interrogation stresses the futility of torture as a CI practice and the techniques that do work. There are two chapters on surveillance: one covering managing human surveillance, the other describing the use of technical means—wire taps, photography, and the like. Of special importance are a series of chapters on double agents—“no term is more misused” (91); moles, “your best weapon” (135); and defectors, “your second best weapon” (154). The final chapters cover working with other intelligence services or liaison, the importance of files, the analysis of the data collected, and the important role of deception.

Originally published in 1987 and long out of print, *Thwarting Enemies* has been used as a text in various introductory CI courses including those at the National Defense Intelligence College. With his characteristic bumper sticker simplicity, Johnson provides short case studies to illustrate his points with a sense of humor that is evident throughout. Georgetown University Press has reproduced the original text and some outdated terminology—as for example “defector-in-place”—remains. But for those interested

in what counterintelligence is and the essential tradecraft that gets the job done, *Thwarting Enemies* has no competition—a genuine classic.

Intelligence Abroad

Anuj Dhar, *CIA's Eye on South Asia* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2008), 492 pp., index.

The CIA is an evergreen topic, and the three letters in a book's title always attract attention. Indian journalist Anuj Dhar has capitalized on this phenomenon in his three-part book, which purports to reveal CIA activities in South Asia since 1951. But the 20-page first part discusses only Agency declassification policies and history, in that curious order. Part three, called the *Annexure (402–62)*, is titled, *How CIA Tilted the Scales in the Bangladesh War: An unnamed India Cabinet minister's leaks saved Pakistan from annihilation in 1971*. Based almost entirely on American sources, it contains some author commentary, little analysis, and no conclusions.

The majority of the book—some 360 pages—consists of 72 declassified CIA assessments dealing with various policies and events in South Asia between 1951 and 2007. Topics covered include US aid to Pakistan, country surveys, India's internal politics, the Kashmir crisis, India-Pakistan relations, and nuclear proliferation. This part has three surprising features. First, the assessments have been “censored” or “redacted”—both terms are used. And though the redacted sections are indicated in the narrative, Dhar gives no description of what he left out. Second, the author provides no introductory analysis to explain why an assessment was selected, how it relates to what follows, and in some cases who wrote it. For example, in a memorandum discussing the “implications of an Indian victory over Pakistan,” the source agency is not mentioned, nor does Dhar provide any analysis as to whether the memo got it right. (216–21) Finally, there is no summary to address the significance of the articles presented—individually or collectively.

In the end, readers are left to make what sense they can from this collection of documents that at best provides a less than comprehensive glimpse of some potentially formative factors in US policy toward South Asia.

